Chapter 4
The decision-making process,
or the reign of the irrational
In the previous chapter, we studied cognitive dissonance and other cognitive biases, and observed that this leads to unsatisfactory functioning in organizations—namely, a formal organization built on myths. In this chapter, we will go into the mechanics of decision-making through a few examples and propose improvements at the end of chapter 7.
To do this, we will first lay the groundwork, by clarifying that a serious decision-making process must satisfy four constraints. First, the person conducting the decision-making process must have the necessary skills. Second, they must devote the amount of work required by the complexity of the subject. Third, they must be sincere in their conclusions, rather than letting them be influenced by a particular interest. Finally, they must not be affected by beliefs that would lead to biased conclusions in good faith.
A few examples
Let's illustrate this with a first example: the various points of a French president’s electoral program, elected by universal suffrage in a two-round system. Who guarantees the relevance of each of these points, and what is the robustness of the process that led to their elaboration?
If we assume that the seriousness of the program is guaranteed by the candidate and their campaign team, then the third constraint, namely sincerity, is particularly problematic. Indeed, we all know that campaigns now last several months and candidates shape their programs via a feedback loop from polls. Under such conditions, can we really say that a specific policy is the result of careful study, or must we admit that it is more likely an element to optimize a marketing positioning?
If we now assume that the validation of these points comes from the sovereign choice of voters, it is even more problematic. Indeed, how can we consider that a specific point was validated by the election when, on the one hand, the second round saw the opposition of a moderate and an extremist candidate, meaning that voters have mainly taken a position based on this single element, and on the other hand, voters do not have the ability to express their individual position on the various points of the campaign.
Yet, once the election is over, recent governments present the fulfillment of campaign commitments as a sign of seriousness. This simply amounts to abolishing reason in favor of the sanctification of the voter's vote.
Through this first example, we observe that the general lines of the decisions affecting the collective in the medium term have been defined by the application of a biased methodology and validated by a dogmatic methodology.
Let's now take a second example. At the beginning of the 21st century, at a certain stage in their development, companies feel the need to adopt an integrated management software solution (Enterprise Resource Planning in English) to digitally track all their activities. The choice of this software has major and long-term consequences on the future of the company, as it is as critical an operation as the merger between two companies. Indeed, the company had a culture, i.e., its specific way of understanding its activity, stemming from its particular history. On the other side, the ERP system implies a standardized way of conducting the activity. The whole issue is therefore to bring these two different visions of the activity together. In an ideal world, the ERP system would be adapted to the particularities of the company, but in practice, the cost of adaptations is so high that it is only partially done, and it is largely the company that ends up being forced to adopt the logic of the ERP system, as if, in effect, it had been absorbed by the company that the ERP system symbolically models. This leads to a significant aggravation of the phenomenon of a practical organization, that of the operational staff, which is set up in parallel with the official organization, that of the ERP system, as described by Meyer and Rowan, which we saw in chapter 3.
Let's now move on to what we are particularly interested in here, namely the process that leads to the choice of the ERP system and the anticipation of the adaptations to be made, as well as the visualization of the resulting future organization. What the practice shows is that the ERP system will be 'sold' to the company via a completely general PowerPoint-type presentation, at the heart of which is, on the one hand, the list of the ERP's references, i.e. resolving cognitive dissonance through social reinforcement linked to the choice, and on the other hand, mythical concepts such as the supposed return on investment.
We are therefore dealing here with an extreme case of what we have just defined at the end of chapter 3 as the cognitive bias of symbolic evaluation. Indeed, within the company, apart from the references, any comparison with other ERP systems is usually limited to a simplistic list of the respective functionalities of the different software, most often evaluated by a tick or a number. When will the company evaluate the cost of adapting to all of its activities as it currently practices them? Never. When will the company evaluate the effect of the ERP system on its future capacity to adapt its activity? Never.
In the end, we can see that the heuristic that guided the decision-making process is here the social reinforcement of cognitive dissonance, or, more bluntly, a herd-like behavior. And yet, knowing that within a company, about half of the organizational optimizations involve IT, the choice of ERP has absolutely major consequences on the future of the company. How then can we explain such a casual approach? This is linked to the fact that today, the honest digital citizen does not exist. A young graduate from a business school or another generalist university does not have the slightest concrete knowledge of setting up an automated process, even a simple one. For them, it is necessary to have a specialist draft a request for proposal. As a result, they have no capacity to anticipate either the complexity that will result, or the level of alignment of the final result with the actual activity. Consequently, the cognitive bias of overconfidence, detailed in chapter 3, plays a very strong role at the time of the decision. If we go back to the breakdown of the decision-making process into four steps presented at the beginning of this chapter, we can see that, in this case, there are neither the necessary skills, nor the sufficient amount of work, so the company embarks on the project on the sole basis of 'others have done it,' which explains the high number of such projects that go off the rails or completely fail. For example, the deployment of SAP at DHL (1), or the Chorus and Louvois projects in France (2). The message from Frank Appel, CEO of DHL, following the failure of the implementation is very revealing: 'We are taking new steps to ensure that this modernization is truly focused on the needs of the business.' On the Chorus side, we find an illustration of the second cognitive bias mentioned in chapter 3, which is very common in government projects in which the initial decision-maker is the final arbiter, namely rushing ahead, with the risk of a greater loss than if the situation had been evaluated rationally as soon as the unforeseen difficulties became clear.
We will come back to this in chapter 15, which will present a rational way to approach the digital revolution.
What we observe from these two examples is that current decision-making processes not only need to be improved, but are in fact completely archaic. To put it differently, in the 17th century, we adopted the scientific method, which led to a progressive revolution of our technological know-how. However, at the level of decision-making processes, there has been no significant improvement compared to the practices of Antiquity or the Middle Ages.
Humans are political before they are rational
Let’s approach this methodically. A rigorous decision-making process must satisfy four conditions:
1. The person conducting the decision-making process must have the necessary skills.
2. They must devote the amount of work required by the complexity of the subject.
3. They must be sincere in their conclusions rather than letting them be influenced by a specific interest.
4. They must not be affected by beliefs that would lead to biased conclusions in good faith.
First, note that condition #3 corresponds to the ability to contain the effects of the social ambition discussed in chapter 2, and condition #4 corresponds to the ability to contain the effects of cognitive dissonance discussed in chapter 3.
Second, remember that satisfying three out of four conditions does not in any way guarantee a rigorously sound final decision.
Our intuition and our culture lead us to look at what is positive in terms of means deployed (cognitive bias of symbolic evaluation). For example, a large amount of work or a prominent figure in charge of the file. However, reality functions the other way around: a serious decision must satisfy all four conditions simultaneously. As soon as one of them fails, the quality of the implementation of the others becomes insignificant.
To illustrate this constraint, suppose that we go to our mechanic and say that our car is having problems because the gear shift gets stuck from time to time, and the mechanic instead of dealing with the gear shift issue starts to explain to us that it's a great car, with a fantastic suspension, a very powerful and economic engine, and an exceptional habitable space, etc., so that, in the end, it's a good car and our request is therefore unfounded. We may take offense, because as long as the gear shift gets stuck, the whole car is unusable, which is an obvious fact for us.
What is surprising is that the same type of argumentation provided by a decision-maker to justify a decision is often not seen by us, or even by them, as perfectly inappropriate. One likely explanation is that, as seen in chapter 2, the main motivation of a human being is the game of alliances and not the pursuit of truth. As a result, we prioritize rhetoric over any serious form of reasoning, because rhetoric reveals the individuals capable of winning social contests and therefore the powerful individuals in the group, the individuals with whom it is interesting to ally. In other words, generally, an argument is not so much aimed at establishing or simply better approaching the truth as it is at showing the social status of the person who holds it.
At the level of argument production, the natural functioning of humans does not consist in a rigorous analysis of the situation in all its facets, leading to the choice of the decision that imposes itself. It consists in starting from a conclusion, chosen for reasons that will never be explicitly stated, and often not even consciously, due to cognitive dissonance. Starting from the conclusion, all we seek to do is produce a posteriori a reasoning that supports it, as credible as possible, not based on the scientific basis we have just mentioned in the form of four conditions to meet, but based on the culture of our social environment, i.e., by considering as truths all the beliefs that are widely accepted there. Once again, we are simply illustrating the cognitive bias of symbolic evaluation.
The natural relationship of humans to reasoning can thus be described at the very least as naive. It would in fact be more accurate to describe it as perverse, because it comes down to playing the trickiest with the truth. And yet, we suffer the consequences of the bad decisions resulting from this, i.e., decisions that go against the collective interest and often even common sense. Moreover, since we are aware of these consequences, and since they do not result in practical questioning of the decision-making process itself as we are doing here, it results in a diffuse feeling of distrust towards the elites seen as the source of decisions: 'they are all rotten!' And the problem does not stop there, because this feeling is itself exploited, not on the basis of a serious analysis of its cause as we are doing here, but by always using the same rhetorical process, which constitutes the source feeding populism.
In summary, as the decision-making process is defective, we make bad decisions. As we gradually become aware of the bad decisions through their consequences, but continue not to question this decision-making process, we adopt explanations in the form of beliefs, which are then exploited by populists. From there, the generalized nepotism seen in chapter 2 is unleashed in the literal sense, and social violence gradually becomes uncontrollable.
This first level of analysis therefore shows us a triple methodological deficiency. First, humans do not naturally understand the basics of logic. Second, our main motivation is the search for a good social position and not the search for truth. Finally, in practice, we start from a pre-chosen solution and we are content to add to it a socially plausible argumentation. This pre-chosen solution is both the conscious reflection of our interests and the unconscious reflection of our beliefs and taboos related to cognitive dissonance. Let's illustrate all of this through a third example.
Rhetoric based on beliefs
In 2018, a popular revolt, known as the 'yellow vests' (gilets jaunes), erupted in France. One of the reasons behind it was a sense of being heavily taxed by the poorest while, at the same time, the tax burden on the wealthiest had decreased. The measure that best symbolized this policy was the abolition of the wealth tax (ISF), replaced by a real estate wealth tax (IFI). The difference between the two is that financial income is no longer taxed.
However, at the heart of the conflict, the president of the republic announced a national debate, while from the outset ruling out the reinstatement of the ISF, justifying his decision by stating:
“This tax was abolished for those who invest in our economy, and therefore help to create jobs.”
The program Secrets d'info, broadcast on 23 February 2019 on the radio channel France Inter under the title ISF: A Mixed First Assessment, presented the results of their in-depth investigation into the subject.
Several key points emerged:
First, the beginning of the statement is simply inaccurate. It is not the act of investing in the economy that causes tax exemption. The exemption is unconditional. Perhaps the phrase “those who invest in our economy” is meant in a broad sense, as in the class of capitalists in the Marxist sense. But in that case, the whole sentence becomes nothing more than an apology for ultraliberalism.
Furthermore, the program shows that the second part of the statement regarding job creation is an unfounded assertion. In fact, the abolition of the ISF had the concrete effect of eliminating tax incentives that benefited certain innovative young companies. Therefore, at this stage, nothing proves that the additional attractiveness of France towards foreign investment resulting from this symbolic measure will lead to a greater increase in investment.
Finally, the fundamental problem with this approach is that by moving from the ISF to the IFI, it seems that the state’s revenues have decreased by 3 billion euros. Therefore, if the state has not clearly evaluated what it can do better with an additional 3 billion euros in terms of supported employment, assistance to key sectors, or any other form of action, then it has not articulated what it is giving up. Consequently, focusing on the hypothetical gain is simply not serious.
Let us now examine to what extent the four methodological conditions previously mentioned and necessary to produce a serious decision were met in the context of the decision to abolish the ISF, as defended here.
Firstly, in terms of competence, the France Inter report states that the effects of the reform are poorly understood by the Ministry of Finance, and even more importantly, relevant data was not made available to researchers. Hence, the necessary optimal competence was not sought on this file.
Regarding the amount of work involved, it does not seem that any effort was made to assess the impact on the labor market from the 3 billion euros that would no longer be available. Thus, the conditions were not met for a serious study.
In terms of sincerity, the very fact that the question was presented in such a biased way is sufficient to conclude that sincerity was lacking.
Finally, regarding the risk of being influenced by beliefs, when cross-referencing different statements from the executive, it becomes clear that the central idea is 'making the country attractive for investors,' and that all subsequent decisions are made based on this simple belief that if we are attractive to investors, the economy will do well.
[hubert_tonneau/R19NA7DA/0J2T620/0J2T62015]This last point is crucial. Indeed, investors are not people of extraordinary insight, but on the contrary, individuals who act in a herd-like and irresponsible manner, as shown by the periodic economic crises, the most recent being the fall of Lehman Brothers.
[hubert_tonneau/R19NA7DA/0J2T620/0J2T65E]Thus, when one adopts as a guiding principle becoming attractive to investors, one has renounced reason on two levels. First, the belief that an inflow of capital is sufficient to create prosperity is dogmatic. It is merely a variant of the trickle-down theory, or the Kuznets curve if one prefers (3). Secondly and most importantly, one no longer seeks to understand the complexity of our social and production systems, but simply follows a simplistic ideology. In other words, we have shown that this reasoning is the archetype of backward reasoning, where one starts from a pre-chosen conclusion and, a posteriori, adds a plausible-sounding argument, assuming the widely accepted beliefs of one's social environment. What is specific in this example is that a single belief, fairly easy to guess, was enough to determine the initial conclusion. This belief is that if we are attractive to investors, the economy will do well.
[hubert_tonneau/R19NA7DA/0J2T620/0J3ISMJ]The social weakness of such reasoning is just as obvious: this belief is not shared by the entire population.
[hubert_tonneau/R19NA7DA/0J3ITHT/0J3ITHT15]Therefore, what is interesting to observe is what happens when a crisis arises, in this case, the yellow vest revolt and the strong public support for it. Whereas common sense would have dictated that rhetoric should stop and that a number of issues should be revisited in depth, what we instead see is, on the one hand, responses in the form of new slogans, as we have just seen, that is, the inability to integrate cultural differences and to abandon reliance on beliefs specific to one's own social environment, and on the other hand, the opening of a broad national debate, that is, a subject so wide that it will inevitably be dominated by rhetoric.
This last point is crucial. Indeed, investors are not people of extraordinary foresight, but on the contrary people who act in a herd and irresponsible manner, which is demonstrated by periodic economic crises, the most recent being the fall of Lehman Brothers.
So, when we adopt becoming attractive to investors as our guiding principle, we have renounced reason on two levels. First of all, the belief that the influx of capital is enough to create prosperity is dogmatic. This is just a variation of the trickle-down theory, or the Kuznets curve if you prefer (3). Then and above all, we no longer seek to understand the complexity of our social and production system, but simply to move in the direction of a simplistic ideology. In other words, we have just shown that this reasoning is the archetype of reasoning constructed in reverse, where we start from a chosen conclusion, and where we add, a posteriori, a probable reasoning. .. assuming the commonly accepted beliefs of our social environment. What is particular in this example is that a single belief, fairly easy to guess, was enough to determine the conclusion at the starting point. This belief is that if we are attractive to investors, the economy will do well.
The social weakness of such reasoning is equally obvious: this belief is not shared by the entire population.
Therefore, what is interesting to observe is what happens when the crisis arrives, in this case the revolt of the yellow vests and the significant support of the population. Where common sense would have dictated that the rhetoric stop, and that we take up a certain number of issues on the merits to explore them in greater depth, we instead see on the one hand a response with new little sentences, such as we have just seen it, that is to say the inability to integrate cultural difference and to renounce basing oneself on beliefs specific to one's own social environment, and on the other hand the opening of a great debate , that is to say a subject so broad that it too can only be dominated by rhetoric.
How can such a biased reasoning, both in substance and in the social support it assumes, be produced after careful reflection following a crisis? Because the belief supporting it regarding investors who determine the health of the economy has not been questioned. We have here a perfect illustration of the effects of cognitive dissonance described in Leon Festinger’s book. Faced with a challenge by facts, in this case the belief is not shared by the entire electorate, the individual chooses to reinforce it rather than question it. Festinger addresses this more specifically in his chapter 6, relying on the works of Cooper and Jahoda:
“[…] a prejudiced person is so permeated with prejudice that her perception of issues with a different frame of reference reshapes them to harmonize with her own convictions. Unaware that she is violating the truth, she imposes her own frame of reference on the object of the propaganda [p. 20]”.
What Festinger, Cooper and Jahoda observe but do not explain is the cause of this reinforcement of convictions specific to a social group, where we would expect a questioning of the belief, or at least its non-use since it is not shared by the group to which the message is addressed at this particular moment. This cause must be sought on the side of the other pillar of this book, namely widespread nepotism: in a crisis situation, that is to say a situation of social tension, the natural human reflex is the 'us versus them,' so 'we' tighten ranks, and therefore it is no longer a matter of challenging what constitutes the 'we,' that is to say the beliefs of our social group.
In other words, the crisis has led to a reinforcement of the 'us versus them' at the expense of reasoning, and therefore in the end to a reinforcement of beliefs on both sides.
[hubert_tonneau/R19NA7DA/0J2T6GX/0J2T6GX15]Let us continue our exploration of the current collective decision-making system. In 2017, Mr. Macron was elected on the basis of 'I want to change the way politics is done to counter the rise of the extremes related to discredited elites.' In his view, discredited elites are politicians whose main concern is to gain power within the various parties, while his sole concern will be to reform the country.
[hubert_tonneau/R19NA7DA/0J2T6GX/0J2T6Q0]We now have another illustration of the effects of cognitive dissonance. Indeed, the discrediting of elites does not at all lie in their struggle for power, which most people care nothing about, but in the fact that their decisions are not credible. We have just shown that the new ruling party produces exactly the same kind of non-credible decisions, namely by obeying dogmas, and we see that the opposition parties, moderate or extremist, also proceed in the same non-credible way in their opposition, hence preparing no more for the implementation of any real methodological change in the exercise of power. What we are witnessing is simply the struggle between competing ideologies. The novelty here is called participatory democracy, which consists in the belief that a decision coming from below, or from consensus, would be better.
[hubert_tonneau/R19NA7DA/0J2T6GX/0J2T7BW]Let us return to our guiding principle: a decision is better if and only if the process used to make it is more rigorous, in the sense of better satisfying simultaneously the four conditions we outlined at the beginning of this chapter. In other words, the only thing that makes a difference is to move out of ideology and into rationality. But for that, it is not enough to claim that a particular vision is fairer, more efficient, more natural, and so on. It is necessary to move to decisions that are systematically built and clearly explained.
[hubert_tonneau/R19NA7DA/0J2R0ZD/0J2R0ZD15]The habit does not make the monk, but it does make the decision-maker, and generates the populist.
[hubert_tonneau/R19NA7DA/0J2TMUR/0J2TMUR15]We have just exposed the foolishness of the reasoning that supports current decisions. Let us now examine why such a system has been set up historically and persists to this day.
[hubert_tonneau/R19NA7DA/0J2TS95/0J2TS9515]To do this, let us note that the social structure that frames the current mode of reasoning rests on three pillars. The first is the statutory competence of the person who makes the decision. This mode of organization, which appears absurd in relation to the rationality expressed at the beginning of this chapter in the form of four conditions, makes perfect sense as soon as we place ourselves in a social environment in which it is belief that dominates and not scientific reasoning, that is, a world prior to the 17th century. Indeed, in a world of beliefs, the statutory distribution of power effectively limits the effect of widespread nepotism: each has their prerogatives.
Let us continue our exploration of the collective decision-making system currently in place. In 2017, Mr Macron was elected on the basis of 'I want to change the way of doing politics to stop the rise of extremes linked to discredited elites'. In his representation, the discredited elites are the politicians whose main occupation is the conquest of power within the different parties, while his only concern will be to reform the country.
Here we have a new illustration of the effects of cognitive dissonance. Indeed, the discredit of the elites is absolutely not due to the fact that they fight for power, which the majority of people do not care about, but to the fact that their decisions are not credible. Now we have just shown that the new party in power proceeds in exactly the same non-credible way to produce decisions, namely that it obeys dogmas, and we see that the opposition parties, moderate or extremist, also proceed in the same way in the opposition, therefore do not prepare any more to implement any real change of method in the exercise of power. What we are witnessing is simply the struggle between competing ideologies. The new thing in this area is called participatory democracy, which consists of believing that a decision that comes from below, or from consensus, would be better.
Let's return to the basis that serves as our guiding principle: a decision is better if and only if the process which was used to produce it is more rigorous, in the sense of better simultaneously satisfying the four conditions that we explained at the beginning of this chapter. In other words, the only thing that changes something is to move away from ideology and adopt rationality. But for this, it is not enough to affirm that this or that vision is fairer, more effective, more natural, etc. We must move on to methodically constructed and precisely explained decisions.
The habit does not make the monk, but it makes the decision-maker, and breeds the populist
We have just highlighted the ineptitude of the mode of reasoning which supports current decisions. Let us now see why such a system was put in place historically, and continues today.
Let us note that the social structure which frames the current mode of reasoning is based on three pillars. The first is the statutory competence of the person making the decision. This mode of organization, which seems absurd to us in relation to the rationality expressed at the beginning of this chapter in the form of four conditions, takes on its full meaning when we place ourselves in a social environment in which it is belief which takes precedence and not scientific reason, that is to say a world before the 17th century. Indeed, in a world of beliefs the statutory distribution of power makes it possible to effectively limit the effect of generalized nepotism: to each their own prerogatives.
However, once the rules of the scientific method are firmly established, and mass education is effective, decisions based on a simple statutory distribution of power cease to be credible to a large part of the population.
Indeed, one might have thought that the myths used by elites to build their decisions on simplistic heuristics were shared by all, thus creating a broad consensus, and therefore making the decisions acceptable. However, the interviews reported in the book The Stupidity Paradox: The Power and Pitfalls of Functional Stupidity at Work show that the situation is asymmetric. Only the decision-makers believe in the myths; those who endure the decisions are not deceived. The recent so-called 'yellow vests' revolt is another illustration of this.
[hubert_tonneau/R19NA7DA/0J2TRIV/0J2TRIV15]The second pillar, that is, the strength of the social group supporting a decision, ensured the stability of the social system. Since decisions are supported by the most powerful groups, any attempt at contestation can be suppressed at its very inception.
[hubert_tonneau/R19NA7DA/0J2TRIV/0J2TS2L]Again, democracy, which emerged in many countries following the technological revolution, gradually undermined this foundation. Indeed, using the military to suppress collective dissent over a decision is no longer considered an acceptable mode of governance in a democracy.
[hubert_tonneau/R19NA7DA/0JAL0FW/0JAL0FW15]Finally, the third pillar is repetition. This may take the form of a bulky book in which each argument is weak, but which acquires a certain credibility through simple accumulation, because the author of all that gives the impression of knowing a lot about the subject.
[hubert_tonneau/R19NA7DA/0JAL0FW/0JB90XF]It may particularly take the form of a few arguments repeated endlessly, again and again, which, although being myths, gradually appear to be true, at least partly, because they are progressively anchored in our memory through repetition, thus merging with, or gradually distorting, our own experience (4). Let us give examples of the argument of capitalist trickle-down (5), and the various 'problems' related to immigration (6).
[hubert_tonneau/R19NA7DA/0J2TRPL/0J2TRPL15]In conclusion, the decision system has been maintained without realizing that its first two pillars no longer rested on solid cultural foundations. In other words, the crisis that began in Marx’s time, due to the technological revolution brought about by the implementation of the scientific method, is a crisis of credibility of the decision-making mode. This crisis has persisted for several centuries, merely masked by repression in the 19th century, then by the years of reconstruction after the wars in the 20th century. It will only find a resolution with the adoption of a decision process in line with our new technological capabilities, that is to say credible for current citizens.
The second pillar, namely the strength of the social group that supports a decision, ensured the stability of the social system. Since decisions are supported by the most powerful groups, any hint of dissent can be nipped in the bud.
Here again, democracy, which emerged in multiple countries following the technological revolution, has gradually undermined this foundation. Indeed, using troops to put down collective protest against a decision is no longer considered an acceptable mode of government in a democracy.
Finally, the third pillar is repetition. This may eventually take the form of a big book in which each argument is weak, but which acquires a certain credibility by simple accumulation, because the person who wrote it all gives the impression of knowing a lot about the subject.
This can especially take the form of a few arguments repeated over time, and repeated again, which although being myths, end up appearing as true, at least partially, because gradually anchored in our memory under the effect of repetition, therefore merging with, or progressively biasing, our own experience (4). Let us give as examples the argument of trickle-down capitalism (5), and the various 'problems' linked to immigration (6).
Ultimately, we maintained a decision-making system without realizing that its first two pillars were no longer based on solid cultural foundations. In other words, the crisis which began in Marx's time, due to the technological revolution produced by the implementation of the scientific method, is a crisis of credibility of the decision-making method. This crisis has persisted for several centuries, simply masked by repression in the 19th century, then the years of reconstruction following the wars in the 20th century. It will only find its outcome following the adoption of a decision-making process in line with our new technological capabilities, that is to say credible for current citizens.
At this stage, we can complete the critique we had started in chapter 2 regarding Hannah Arendt’s explanation of the origins of totalitarianism. Indeed, she looks for the explanation on the side of the content of ideologies (7). What we are pointing out here, on the one hand, is that once there is a distrust in the decision-making system, it is illusory to think that no populist group will be formed in order to exploit this resentment without scruples to gain power. It will do so by channeling, through a myth, the powerful 'us versus them' instinct mentioned in chapter 2. On the other hand, fighting the myth itself by reason or morality, whether it is the fear of an invasion by foreigners or the rejection of a social group identified by its customs, appearance or religious beliefs, is practically impossible. Indeed, the adherence to the proposed myth is the result of the cognitive dissonance seen in chapter 3, that is to say the materialization of another but unexpressed anxiety. Accepting that the myth is false would leave the person with an anxiety without explanation. The person does not believe in the myth: she needs it to explain her anxiety. For more details, refer to chapter 10 of Festinger's book regarding the emergence of rumors following earthquakes. If it is largely illusory to want to fight the content, as progressives try to do, what is important to fight, and what Hannah Arendt does not address, is the source of this diffuse anxiety, which is the mistrust in collective decisions.
The divorce at this level between elites and the population is absolutely not because elites are less prone to believe in populist myths because they are better educated, contrary to what is too often stated. It is because of the asymmetry mentioned above: since elites are more involved in the decision-making system, they are more likely to lie to themselves regarding its relevance, and therefore they have less need for other mythical justifications. To be blunt, elites are not more open-minded; their myths simply aim more to justify the decision-making system rather than to explain the anxiety related to not believing in its functioning relevance.
In summary, by relying on the third pillar (repetition), populism creates myths based on the principle of 'us against them' to channel, for the purposes of accessing power, the anxiety linked to non-existence. -confidence in decisions.
In this chapter, we have just illustrated the functioning of the collective decision-making process. While the citizen tends to perceive it as unsatisfactory due to a lack of concern for the public interest on the part of leaders — which the more moderate critics attribute to a simple moral decline and the more extreme ones summarize with the expression 'they're all corrupt' — it now appears more accurate to describe it as incompetent.
From this, it becomes clear that the main characteristic of any social organization system aiming to serve progress for all must be its ability to produce decisions aligned with the common good, starting from individuals who are and will remain biased by widespread nepotism and cognitive dissonance.
In the next two chapters, we will provide some additional clarifications, no longer about human nature, but about our cultural environment, and especially clarify what characterizes our time, so that we can finally outline the main features of this new social organization in chapter 7.
(1)
The DHL transportation company had planned to adopt the integrated SAP software, but eventually gave up on the project, resulting in an estimated loss of 345 million euros.
(2)
Chorus is a platform for managing digitized invoices in the public administration.
Louvois is a centralized payroll software used by the French army, the cost of whose dysfunctions is estimated in the hundreds of millions of euros. See the investigation by the investigative unit of France Inter, featured in the program Secrets d'info of June 22, 2018.
In both cases, it is not the choice of modernization that is criticized, but the initial decision-making process, particularly in terms of assessing the needs and foreseeable difficulties related to the variability of local needs and constraints within large organizations, and especially in taking into account the difficulties encountered.
(3)
The trickle-down theory is not strictly speaking an economic theory, but an image that entered public discourse with the rise of ultraliberalism in the 1980s. It conveys the idea that if the rich become wealthier, they will invest in the economy, and thus the entire population will eventually benefit from it.
Simon Kuznets, on the other hand, argues that in the case of economic growth, even if initially inequalities increase, “the fruits of growth eventually spread to other sectors of the economy.” This is where the concept of the inverted U-shaped curve regarding inequality comes from. This theory has been challenged by the work of Thomas Piketty, who shows that the progress in the distribution of wealth in the first two-thirds of the 20th century is more a result of the positive impact of the two world wars.
(4)
The propaganda of totalitarian countries uses an even more effective version of the repetition system. Indeed, if one gets an individual to perform an action, for example attending a national demonstration, cognitive dissonance then pushes them to adhere to the principles they have endorsed through participation, even if it is against their will. Festinger also teaches us that the effect is all the stronger the less pressure is exerted on the individual to obtain participation, because the individual can then more easily justify their action with a simple 'I had no choice.'
(5)
See the Wikipedia article 'Trickle-down Theory':
“The Merriam-Webster dictionary notes that the first use of the word 'trickle-down' in the economic sense dates back to 1944, and that of 'trickle-down theory' to 1954.
The trickle-down theory emerged in public debate in the 1980s with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.”
After that, the term evolves according to the objectives of political positioning.
“Emmanuel Macron, on his part, defends the metaphor of the 'first in the rope.'”
(6)
The French political party 'Front National,' created in 1972, owes much of its rise to the repeated emphasis in public debate on fantastical issues related to immigration, and especially to its ability to ultimately make this question omnipresent.
For example, during the political show 'Questions Politiques' on April 2, 2017, Stéphane Ravier, a Front National senator, stated: “I remind you, for example, that in this country there is a massive immigration policy that costs the French approximately 70 billion euros per year.”
It is interesting to link this statement to the article in the CNRS journal titled 'The beneficial effect of migration on the economy': “Our research suggests that the political debate on immigration focuses too much on the supposed 'economic cost' of migrants. We show that their presence, whether it concerns permanent migrants or asylum seekers, has no negative economic impact.”
(7)
We have chosen to take Hannah Arendt as our reference not so much out of agreement or opposition with her theses, but because of the importance of the work she dedicated to researching the causes that led to the Holocaust.
It should be noted that the search for causes in the ideological content and historical conditions refers to her major book The Origins of Totalitarianism, and that Hannah Arendt's work does not end there. Indeed, after witnessing the trial of the Nazi Adolf Eichmann, she stated that the accused was driven by his desire for social advancement and not by personal convictions, and especially that at a certain stage, he simply stopped thinking about the moral aspect of his involvement. She then coined the concept of the “banality of evil,” which sparked controversy, as it goes against the reassuring belief that a horror such as the Holocaust could only be perpetuated by monsters fundamentally different from ourselves, especially at the higher hierarchical levels.
However, Hannah Arendt does not make the connection with cognitive dissonance as a key tool of personal blindness, nor with the generalized nepotism that leads to 'us versus them' as a toxic byproduct of social ambition, let alone with the distrust in decisions made by elites to explain the first phase, that is, the rise of populism.
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